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Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.: A
Warning to Successor Corporations
I. Introduction
Traditional principles of corporate law, with several well-established exceptions,1 protect successor corporations2 from liability for claims arising from predecessor corporations' defectively manufactured products." In Schumacher v. Richards
Shear Co., 4 the New York Court of Appeals allowed a cause of

action against a successor corporation premised upon general
tort, rather than corporate law, principles' for injuries caused by
an allegedly defective machine. The court held that a corporation that purchases most of the assets of another firm may have
an independent duty to warn users of the defects in the defunct
firm's products, even though the corporation is not a legal successor. 6 Although allowing the negligence cause of action for
breach of this duty to warn, the court'declined to follow the lead
of several states 7 in allowing a cause of action against the successor corporation under any of the recently developed exceptions
to the rule of nonliability based on strict products liability law.'
1. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
2. A successor corporation has been defined as "another corporation which, through
amalgamation, consolidation, or other legal succession, becomes invested with rights and

assumes burdens of first corporation."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1283 (5th ed. 1979).

3. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v.
Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1977). See also 15 W. FLEsrcaE, CYCLOPEDA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 188-90 (rev. perm. ed. 1973); 19 AM. JUR.
2D Corporations§ 1546, at 922-23 (1965).
4. 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983).
5. Id. at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 199, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
6. Id. at 247, 451 N.E.2d at 199, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
7. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (where
New Jersey followed the product line approach); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560
P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (where California adopted the product line approach);
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (where Michigan
adopted the continuity of enterprise approach). See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these exceptions to corporate nonliability.
8. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 243, 451 N.E.2d at 197, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 439. See infra
notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Note explains the traditional view of successor nonliability and its exceptions. It then describes the recent
emergence of case law which provides injured product users with
special protection when a corporation has purchased the assets
of the original manufacturer. Part III presents the facts and decision of Schumacher, and Part IV analyzes the decision. Finally, the Note concludes that although Schumacher may signal
increased liability for successor corporations, further case law is
necessary to define the scope of the decision.
II. Background
As a general rule, a corporation that acquires the assets of
another corporation is not liable for the torts of its predecessor, 9
although courts have recognized several exceptions. As noted by
the New York Court of Appeals in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Canron, Inc.,10 a corporation may, in spite of the general rule, be held liable for the torts of its predecessor if (1) it
expressly or impliedly assumes the predecessor's tort liability,"
9. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3D 881 (1973); 19 AM. Jun. 2D Corporations§ 1546 (1965);
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1380 (1940). See, e.g., Phillips, Corporations:A Corporateand
Commercial Perspective, 11 HoFsmR L. REv. 249 (1982); Note, Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.: New Jersey Adopts the "ProductLine" Approach to Successor Corporation Liability, 33 MERCER L. Rzv. 681, 687 (1982).
The general rule of nonliability is explained in Chase v. Michigan Tel. Co., 121
Mich. 631, 80 N.W. 717 (1899).
If A. [sells] his manufacturing plant or business of any kind to B., B. does not
thereby assume the debts of A., unless he agrees to. B.'s liability is not affected by
the fact that A. or B., or both, are corporations. The same rule of law applies to
both. The mere fact of sale does not establish liability.
Id. at 636, 80 N.W. at 719.
10. 43 N.Y.2d 823, 373 N.E.2d 364, 402 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1977). Hartford involved an
action for damages arising from' the rupture of pipes. It was brought against the manufacturer-seller of the pipe and against the corporation which, in the interval between the
installation and rupture of the pipe, had acquired some but not all of the assets of the
manufacturer-seller. The court found the buyer corporation not liable. Id. at 824, 373
N.E.2d at 364, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
11. Id. at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 566. It has long been true that an
express or implied agreement to assume a selling corporation's liabilities will impose liability upon the buying corporation. Whether such an assumption has been made rests on
the interpretation of the purchase agreement. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 3, §§
7114-15, 7122, 7124. For cases finding no assumption of liability, see Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J.
Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), affd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972). For cases
finding assumption of liability, see Turnbull, Inc. v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1967); Campbell v. Hickory Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 190 S.E.2d 26 (1972).
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(2) there is a consolidation or merger of the selling and purchasing corporations,1 ' (3) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the selling corporation,1 8 or (4) the 1 transaction
is
4
entered into fraudulently to escape such liability.
The general rule, based on corporate law principles designed
to protect creditors and shareholders, 5 has led to harsh results

12. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 566. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.
Mich. 1974); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970).
The court in Shannon summarized the characteristics of a de facto merger, a concept that had been introduced in McKee:
(1). There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that
there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations.
(2). There is a continuity of shareholders which result from the purchasing
corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that
they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
(3). The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4). The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. at 801. See also 15 W. FLzrCHE, supra
note 3, § 7121.
13. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 566. See 19 AM. Jun. 2D Corporations § 1558 (1965). This exception
involves the situation where one corporation sells its assets to another corporation but
the same people own both corporations. Thus, the acquiring corporation is really a reincarnation of the acquired corporation, in essence, a reorganization.
See also Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (expanding the mere
continuation exception). While identical ownership will establish the exception, other
factors might also be sufficient, such as whether the same employees and management
continue in the succeeding corporation, the same products are produced, and the same
facilities are used. Another significant factor is the nature of the continuation itself, exemplified by the use of the predecessor's goodwill. Use of the same name, while an important factor, is not essential for recovery. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich.
406, 452, 244 N.W.2d 873, 894 (1976) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (citing Cyr v. B. Offen &
Co., 501 F.2d at 1153).
14. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 566. See 19 Am. Jun 2D Corporations § 1558 (1965). The general rule of
nonliability holds except where the transaction is fraudulent as to creditors of the transferor. The creditors may then follow the property to the transferee. "Indicia of fraud
may be inadequate consideration paid to the transferor, and/or lack of good faith." Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 437, 244 N.W.2d at 887 (Coleman, J.,
dissenting).
15. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 341, 431 A.2d 811, 816 (1981);
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 394 Mich. at 417-18, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78.
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when applied in products liability cases. 6 An injured plaintiff
may be left without a remedy when the corporation that manufactured the defective product no longer exists and the successor
corporation is shielded from liability.17 The social policy behind
products liability, however, is to provide compensation for those
injured by defective products by placing the cost of such injuries
on the manufacturer, who can insure against such losses or pass
them on to the public as a cost of doing business. s To further
this policy, some states have broadened successor liability to allow successor corporations to be sued for products liability
claims arising out of the manufacture and sale of defective products by predecessor corporations in cases where the traditional
exceptions to the general rule are inapplicable. Courts have
recognized causes of action against successor corporations primarily under three theories: (1) the continuity of enterprise doctrine, 0 (2) the product line approach, 1 and (3) the duty to warn
principle.2 The first two approaches are extensions of strict
products liability law to successor corporations, while the third
is based on traditional negligence principles.23

16. See Sardell, Products Liability and Successor Responsibility for Defects, 6
CoRn. L. REv. 82 (1983).
17. See Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 878-79. See
infra notes 28-30.
18. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30-31, 560 P.2d 3, 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 57980 (1977); see also Sardell, supra note 16, at 83; Note, Products Liability: Successor
Corporations:Liability for Defective Products, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 846, 850 (1982).
19. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 9, at 250-51; Sardell, supra note 16, at 83; Note,
supra note 9, at 684-85.
20. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Ray v. Mad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977);
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). See infra notes 34-43
and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g, Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980), Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.
1977). See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
23. A key distinction between "strict products liability" and traditional negligence is
that when a court imposes "strict liability" the defendant must pay damages although he
neither intentionally injured the plaintiff nor failed to meet the objective standard of
reasonable care that traditionally has been at the root of negligence law. See W. PaossRn, LAW oF TORTS 641-82 (4th ed. 1971); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981).
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Continuity of Enterprise

Under the continuity of enterprise theory, the merger and
consolidation exception and the mere continuation exception are
extended under products liability law to situations in which they
would be inapplicable under corporate law.2" A common feature
of these two traditional exceptions is the continuity of shareholders between the selling and purchasing corporations.25 Thus,
a sale for stock is more likely to result in liability than a sale for
cash.' Under the continuity of enterprise theory, the distinction
between types of consideration paid to acquire the assets of the
predecessor corporation is eliminated as a factor in imposing liability on a successor corporation as long as the plaintiff can establish facts that prove a continuity of the business enterprise.2
The continuity of enterprise theory was articulated in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 8 where the plaintiff, injured by
24. See Note, supra note 18, at 855-56; Note, Intermediate and Successor Corporations Strictly Liable Under Product Line Standard, 12 S9roN HAL L. REV. 327, 331-32
(1982); Recent Development, Successor Corporation Strictly Liable for Defective Products Manufactured by the PredecessorCorporation,27 VILL. L. REV. 411, 416-17 (19811982) [hereinafter cited as Successor Corporation].
25. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970). See supra notes 1213.
26. See Note, supra note 18, at 848. The stated difference between a stock payment
and a cash payment is that with a stock payment there is a commonality of ownership
and with a cash payment there is not. The shareholders of the first company become, as
a result of the stock transfer, shareholders of the second corporation.
With cash, it may be asserted that "the two corporations were strangers before the
sale and continued to remain strangers after the sale." McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109
N.J. Super. at 566, 264 A.2d at 104.
27. See Note, supra note 18, at 856.
28. 397 Mich. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. In 1969, while working at a power press,
the plaintiff, Charles Turner, lost his hands in an accident. The power press had been
purchased by Turner's employer in 1968; it had been manufactured by T.W. & C.B.
Sheridan Company (Old Sheridan), a New York corporation established in 1903. In 1974,
Harris Intertype (Harris) took over the total business, goodwill, name, and assets of Old
Sheridan, and Old Sheridan filed a certificate changing its name. Harris then set up a
new subsidiary corporation under the name of New Sheridan, which acquired the assets
of Old Sheridan and took over the business liabilities shown in its books. Old Sheridan
then dissolved. Id. at 411-13, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
Turner sued Harris and New Sheridan, which by then had become a Harris division.
Harris and New Sheridan denied liability. Harris argued that it was a bona fide purchaser only of the corporate assets, that it paid over six million dollars in cash, and that
while it had agreed to assume every known liability of the seller as of 1964, it definitely
was not liable for a products liability claim against the seller that did not even occur
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an allegedly defective power press, sued the corporation that
had purchased the manufacturing corporation's assets for cash.
The Turner court refused to distinguish between sales for cash
and sales for stock.2 The court reasoned that in a products liability case, the method by which the assets of the selling corporation were acquired is irrelevant to both the injured plaintiff
and to the successor corporation."0 The court found four factors
that, despite the absence of shareholder continuity, established a
prima facie showing of continuity of the enterprise:
(1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise apparently,
a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations,
and even the [predecessor's] name.
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received from the buying corporation.
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation
of the normal business operations of the seller corporation.
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world
as the effective continuation of the seller corporation.31
until five years after the sale. Id. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
29. Id. at 422, 244 N.W.2d at 880. The court in Turner conceded that, technically,
the distinction between cash and stock is viable. The presence of stock as consideration
should be one factor to consider in ascertaining whether there is a sufficient nexus between the successor and predecessor corporations to establish successor liability. The
absence of an exchange of stock, however, should not be conclusive. The proportionate
number of shares paid out by the acquiring corporation may be very small in a corporate
assets purchase, so that the strength of commonality of ownership is minimal. The continuity of shareholders is more likely to be a paper one, more symbolic than real. The
actual owners of shares at the time of manufacture of the defective product and the
actual owners at the time of the sale of the corporate assets may be entirely different
individuals. Id. at 422, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
30. Id. at 421-24, 244 N.W.2d at 878-80. The court acknowledged that it
is unfair and unbelievable that a corporate combination or acquisition decision
would be principally made on the basis of cutting off the contingent right to sue of
a products liability victim. From that, two conclusions suggest themselves. First, it
would seem illogical that a merger or de facto merger be encumbered by liability
for a products liability suit while a cash acquisition of corporate assets is free from
such liability. Second, if there are no real business reasons for choosing a cash
acquisition of corporate assets and the only real reason is to avoid products liability suits, then it would seem that the machinery of corporate law is unreasonably
geared up to accomplish a purpose not really intended for it or in the public
interest.
Id. at 422-23, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
31. Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
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On the basis of these factors, the court reversed the summary judgment for the defendant.8 2 The effect of the continuity
of enterprise approach was to extend the merger and consolidation exception and the mere continuation exception to transactions that "resemble one of the traditional kinds without meeting the technical requirements."Is
B. Product Line Approach
The product line approach, unlike the continuity of enterprise theory, is not an expansion of the traditional exceptions to
nonliability, but a major departure from them based on the social policies underlying strict products liability." The seminal
case of the product line approach is Ray v. Alad Corp.," where
the California Supreme Court held that "a party which acquires
a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the
same product line previously manufactured and distributed by
the entity from which the business was acquired.""
In Ray, the plaintiff brought an action in strict products liability against Alad Corporation for personal injuries arising from
the use of a defective ladder. The defendant successor corporation had neither manufactured nor sold the ladder, but had
bought the manufacturing corporation for cash. The successor
corporation continued to manufacture the same line of ladders.
32. Id. at 431, 244 N.W. 2d at 884.
33. Note, supra note 18, at 856.
34. See Note, supra note 9, at 686-87; Successor Corporation,supra note 24, at 41718.
35. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
36. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
37. Id. at 25-28, 560 P.2d at 4-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 574-78. The plaintiff, Herbert Ray
was injured by a fall from a defective ladder. The ladder had been manufactured by Alad
Corporation (Alad I). One year before the accident, Alad I had sold its stock in trade,
fixtures, equipment, inventory, and goodwill to Lighting Maintenance Corporation
(Lighting). Mlad I agreed to dissolve and to help Lighting set up a new corporation under
the Alad name (Alad II). Lighting consented to accept and pay for materials previously
ordered by Mad I in the course of its business and to fill Alad I's uncompleted orders.
No discussion was made regarding defects in products previously sold or made by Alad I.
When Alad II was organized, it continued to use Alad I's manufacturing plant, machinery, office fixtures, equipment, and inventory. It also continued to employ the same factory personnel and to manufacture the same type of ladder. With the exception of a new
logo, there was no indication on Alad II's printed materials to show that a new company
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After concluding that none of the four exceptions to the
general rule of successor nonliability was applicable, the court
considered the social policies behind imposing strict tort liability
for defective products.38 The court then found three justifications for imposing liability under the facts in Ray.3 9 First, the
court reasoned, the plaintiff's remedies against the predecessor
corporation had been virtually destroyed by the corporate succession. Unless the plaintiff could sue the successor, procedural
and pragmatic barriers40 would bar recovery. 4 1 Second, the successor corporation would be able to spread the risk of the defective product throughout society, because it had acquired all the
assets of the predecessor corporation and, by continuing to manufacture the product, could easily pass on the costs to new consumers.42 Third, the successor corporation had received a benefit
from the transfer to it of the predecessor corporation's goodwill.
This benefit, along with the fact that the successor held itself
out to customers as the same enterprise as its predecessor, made
it fair that the successor should also assume the burden of comwas manufacturing the Alad ladder. Ray, therefore, sued Alad II. Id.
38. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. See supra note 18.
39. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
40. Assuming that the plaintiff was injured as a result of defects in a ladder manufactured by Alad I and thus could assert strict tort liability against Alad I, the practical
value of the right of recovery against the original manufacturer was vitiated by the
purchase of Alad I's tangible assets, trade name, and goodwill on behalf of Alad II and
the dissolution of Alad I within two months thereafter in accordance with the purchase
agreement. Id. at 31-32, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. The injury giving rise to the
plaintiff's claim against Alad I did not happen until more than six months after the filing
of the dissolution certificate stating that Alad I's known debts and liabilities had been
paid and its known assets had been distributed to its shareholders. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at
9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. This distribution was proper because there was no prerequisite
that allowance be made for claims such as plaintiff's that had not yet come into existence. Thus, even if the plaintiff could get a judgment on his claim against the dissolved
and assetless Alad I, he would encounter incredible obstacles in trying to obtain satisfaction of the judgment from former stockholders or directors. Id.
Products liability insurance was unlikely in Alad because it is usually limited to
accidents or events taking place while the policy is in effect. Thus, the products liability
insurance of a company that has gone out of business is not a good source of compensation for injury from a product the company previously manufactured. Id. at 32, 560 P.2d
at 9-10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81.
41. Id. at 32-33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See generally Sardell, supra
note 16, at 83; Note, supra note 9, at 687.
42. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 25, 31, 560 P.2d at 5, 9, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 576,
580. See also Sardell, supra note 16, at 83; Note, supra note 9, at 687; Note, supra note
24, at 333; Note, supra note 18, at 851.
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pensating for injuries caused by defective products."'
C.

Duty to Warn

Unlike the continuity of enterprise and the product line
theories, the duty to warn imposes liability on a successor corporation, not for the acts of its predecessor, but for the breach of
its own duty." Under this theory, a purchasing corporation may

have a duty to warn users of defects found in the predecessor
corporation's products. 4 5 Although the duty is that of the successor corporation, the rationale for imposing the duty is similar to
that for imposing strict products liability on a successor corpora-

tion for the acts of its predecessor. 4" The successor that benefits
from the predecessor's customer contacts and goodwill and that
represents itself as the same enterprise as
should be given the responsibility of notifying
customers of subsequently discovered defects
sor's product. 4 7 In addition, the successor that

the predecessor
the predecessor's
in the predecescontinues manu-

facturing the product has the capability and duty to test and
improve the product." Therefore, it is arguably in the best posi-

tion to discover the pre-existing defects.'9
Although the rationale behind the duty to warn is similar to
that behind strict products liability, the elements comprising the
two theories of recovery are distinguishable. The judicially created product line theory places liability on the successor for the

acts of its predecessor. On the other hand, the duty of the suc43. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
In Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981), the New Jersey
Supreme Court followed the California Supreme Court's reasoning in adopting the product line approach to successor liability. The court held that "the social policies underlying strict products liability in New Jersey are best served by extending strict liability to
a successor corporation that acquires the business assets and continues to manufacture
essentially the same line of products as the predecessor." Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
44. See Sardell, supra note 16, at 84; Note, supra note 24, at 350.
45. See Note, supra note 18, at 857.
46. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); W. lNossER, LAw OF
ToRTs 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). See also Note, supra note 24, at 350.
47. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d at 866.
48. See Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
49. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d at 865-66. See also Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F.
Supp. at 530. The successor corporation owes a higher standard of care because its control over the product enables it to have power to prevent harm from a pre-existing
defect.
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cessor corporation to warn arises from its own activities in servicing and continuing to manufacture the product.5 0
A duty to warn is not automatically imposed on a successor
corporation, but arises from two factors spelled out by a federal
court in Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc.:51 the successor knew or
should have known of the defect in the product, and a special
relationship existed between the successor and the buyer of the
product.5 2 Although there is no definitive test for such a special
relationship, essentially it is the continuation by the successor of
the relationship that the predecessor had with the customer."
Such relationship, the Leannais court suggested, may exist
where the successor takes over the predecessor's service contracts, actually services the product, has knowledge of the defect, and knows the owner's identity and location. 4

50. See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Shane v.
Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. at 530 (where succession to the assets of the predecessor does
not trigger the duty to warn about pre-existing defects).
51. 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff was injured while operating a machine
during the course of his employment and brought suit against the corporate successors to
the original manufacturer of the machine. The plaintiff alleged causes of action based on
strict liability, negligence in the design and manufacture of the machine, and a failure to
warn of a defect in the machine. Id. at 438.
The machine in question had been manufactured by Forte Equipment Co. and sold
to the plaintiff's employer in 1964. In 1967, Forte sold its assets to Cincinnati, Inc. Cincinnati, Inc. established a subsidiary named Cincinnati-Forte to accept the Forte assets.
The subsidiary was dissolved in 1973 and the assets of Cincinnati-Forte were purchased
by Cincinnati, Inc. Id.
In the Forte-Cincinnati, Inc. agreement, Cincinnati, Inc. expressly limited its liability for personal injury caused by Forte to five years, 1967-1972. Cincinnati, Inc. was first
notified of the plaintiff's injury in 1975, more than seven years after the acquisition of
Forte's assets. Id. at 438-39.
The court held that a question of material fact existed as to whether the successor
corporation received notice of injury claims and thus, had a duty to warn present and
former purchasers of the dangerous condition of the machine. Id. at 442-43. Therefore,
the case was remanded.
52. Id. at 442. See Note, supra note 18, at 857.
53. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d at 866. The common denominator in cases holding that a successor corporation has a duty to warn has been the existence of an ability
to control the product. This control is exhibited by a continuation of business ties between the successor corporation and the customers of the predecessors. Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also Sardell, supra
note 16, at 84.
54. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 442. See also Travis v. Harris Corp., 565
F.2d at 449.
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Summary

For reasons of social policy, courts have fashioned new theories under which liability can be imposed on successor corporations." The continuity of enterprise theory expands the traditional exceptions to the rule of nonliability by focusing on the
relationship between the predecessor and successor corporations
as business enterprises.6 The product line theory takes a more
direct approach, de-emphasizing the relationship between the
two corporations.6 Under this approach, the fact that a successor continues to manufacture the same or nearly the same product, benefiting from the goodwill of the predecessor, is material."8 Finally, the duty to warn theory, based on general
negligence principles, looks not to the relationship between the
corporations or to the continued production of the product, but
to the relationship between the successor and the customer of
the predecessor.5 9 Prior to Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.,60
the New York Court of Appeals had adopted none of these approaches to successor liability.
III.
A.

Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.

Facts and Lower Court Decisions

In April, 1978, plaintiff lost the sight of his right eye when
he was struck by a piece of metal thrown from a hydraulic shearing machine he was operating in the course of his employment.
The machine had been sold to plaintiff's employer, Wallace
Steel and Supply Co. (Wallace Steel), by Richards Shear Company (Richards Shear) in 1964. In 1968, Richards Shear entered
into an agreement with Logemann Brothers Co. (Logemann),
granting Logemann the exclusive right to manufacture and sell
its products and to use the trade name "Richards." The transac55. See supra notes 9-54 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Note, supra note 24, at 331-32; see also supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
57. See Note, supra note 9, at 689; see also Successor Corporation,supra note 24,
at 418.
58. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
59. See Sardell, supra note 16, at 84.
60. Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 243, 245, 451 N.E.2d 195,
197, 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439, 440 (1983).
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tion was, essentially, a sale of assets. Richards Shear discontinued its business, although it survived as a corporate entity with
minor assets.61
A month after the agreement, Logemann notified Wallace
Steel of its acquisition of Richards Shear and of its availability
to replace parts and service equipment. 62 In July, 1968,
Logemann serviced the Richards Shear machine at Wallace
Steel. Other than complying with requests for replacement
parts, the only other contact between the successor corporation
and Wallace Steel prior to the commencement of plaintiff's suit
was an advisory letter dated April 16, 1976, in which Logemann
notified the president of Wallace Steel that it had entered into a
service contract with a named individual to provide service for
Richards Shear machinery.'s
Plaintiff contended in his action against Richards Shear and
Logemann that the machine was defective in design and manufacture in that it did not have a protective guard or shield to
prevent metal from being thrown by the machine and that the
defendants should have warned users of the existing dangerous
condition, or taken corrective action to remedy it."' The trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint against the successor
corporation, finding "no factual basis upon which it could be
cast in liability as a 'successor' to Richards Shear."6
The appellate division affirmed the trial court's dismissal,
finding that none of the four traditional exceptions to nonliability set forth in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Canron,
Inc.66 applied. e While the plaintiff in Hartford based its claim
of successor liability on theories of negligence and breach of warranty,68 the court in Schumacher perceived no reason why a
claim in strict products liability should not be subject to the
61. Id. at 242-44, 451 N.E.2d at 196-97, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 438-40.
62. Id. at 244, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
63. Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 88 A.D.2d 1071, 1071-72, 452 N.Y.S.2d 736,
736-37 (3d Dep't 1982).
64. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 244, 451 N.E.2d 197, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
65. Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 88 A.D.2d at 1072, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
66. 43 N.Y.2d 823, 825, 373 N.E.2d 364, 365, 402 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (1977); see supra
notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
67. Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 88 A.D.2d at 1072, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
68. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
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same rule.69 Moreover, the court emphasized, no duty should be
imposed directly upon Logemann to warn or instruct Wallace
Steel on the use of a machine provided by Richards Shear when
the injury happened some fourteen years after the purchase. 0
B.

The Decision of the New York Court of Appeals

The issue on appeal, as stated by the court, was whether
"Logemann [was] liable to the plaintiff for the tortious conduct

of Richards Shear or for its own conduct subsequent to acquiring Richards Shear's assets."71 The court modified the trial
court's decision by affirming the dismissal of the strict products

liability cause of action, but denying the dismissal of the cause
of action based on negligence. 7 ' The rule of Hartford,"7 the court
held, protected Logemann from liability as a successor corporation for Richards Shear's actions.7 4 The court recognized, however, that a successor corporation may be liable in negligence be-

cause of its independent duty to warn those injured by unsafe
machinery manufactured and sold by its predecessor corporation. Such a duty is based upon the special relationship between

the successor corporation and the purchaser and upon the
knowledge the successor corporation possesses or has reason to

possess about the machine. The court found sufficient evidence
to create an issue of fact, thus making summary judgment for

the defendant on the duty to warn issue inappropriate. 5
69. Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 88 A.D.2d at 1072, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
70. Id. The court further added that "the time element alone bears heavily on the
lack of foreseeability that such an incident would occur and leads inescapably to the
conclusion that, applying the ordinary rules of negligence, there was no lack of reasonable care under the circumstances." Id. at 1072, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 737-38 (citing Torrogrossa v. Towmotor Co., 44 N.Y.2d 709, 710, 376 N.E.2d 920, 921, 405 N.Y.S.2d 448,
449 (1978); Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Gos Dexter, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348
N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976)).
71. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 242, 451 N.E.2d at 197, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
72. Id. at 243, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
73. Hartford Acc. & Indem. CO. v. Canton, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d at 825, 373 N.E.2d at 365,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 566; see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
74. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 243, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
75. Id. at 248-49, 451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442. In deciding against summary judgment, the court declared that other than the single service call (which by itself
may not be enough to sustain a duty to warn), Logemann knew of the location and owner
of the machine and willingly offered to service it. In addition, Logemann held itself out
on at least two occasions as having expertise in the product line it had acquired from
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The dissenters in Schumacher agreed with the dismissal of
the strict products liability cause of action. 76 They also acknowledged that a successor corporation may have an independent
duty to warn customers of product defects." According to the
dissenters, however, the facts in the record were insufficient as a
matter of law to establish the special relationship necessary to
create such a duty.78
The dissenters also contended that the plaintiff had failed
to plead an essential element of a negligence cause of action:
that the defendant's breach of duty was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury.79 In addition, one dissenter reasoned, no
duty to warn existed in this case, because the alleged defect was
open and obvious, thus negating the need for such warning.se
Richards Shear. Although Logemann apparently did not officially assume Richards
Shear's service contracts, it did offer to service the machine to the potential economic
benefit of both parties. Id.
The court stated that at trial, plaintiff must establish that a duty to warn existed
based upon these contacts between defendant Logemann and plaintiffs employer. "Its
liability, if any, arises out of this relationship, not because of any successor liability or
because it acted as a serviceman or repairman for the machine." Id. at 249, 451 N.E.2d at
200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
76. Id. at 250, 451 N.E.2d at 201, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 257, 451 N.E.2d at 205, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge
Simons wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Wachtler and Meyer
concurred.
77. Id. at 250, 451 N.E.2d at 201, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 257-58, 451 N.E.2d at 205, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 447 (Jones, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 250-54, 451 N.E.2d at 201-03, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 443-45 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see also id. at 257-60, 451 N.E.2d at 205-07, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 447-49 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 250, 451 N.E.2d at 201, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Jasen, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 261, 451 N.E.2d at 207, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (Jones, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 254-55, 451 N.E.2d at 203-04, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
At common law the duty to warn extended only to hidden (latent) dangers or to
products that were inherently dangerous in a way which would likely remain undetected
by a consumer. If the danger was obvious (patent), there was no duty to warn. Id. at 254,
451 N.E.2d at 203, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
The majority believed that the court's decision in Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of
Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), had eliminated the distinction between latent and patent defects. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 249,
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442. The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the
distinction had been eliminated only in strict products liability causes of action based on
design defects, not in causes of action based on the duty to warn. Id. at 255, 451 N.E.2d
at 204, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
The application of the latent/patent distinction to the duty to warn is not specifically related to the issue of successor liability and is thus beyond the scope of this Note.
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IV. Analysis
The court of appeals found correctly that none of the traditional exceptions to nonliability set out in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Canron, Inc.8 1 was applicable in Schumacher
v. Richards Shear Co.as Since the plaintiff's causes of action
sounded in strict products liability and negligence, however, the
court had the opportunity to consider the more recently formulated exceptions to the rule of nonliability 8 3 The decision is unclear, however, as to whether the court is amenable to recognizing a cause of action based on either the continuity of enterprise
or the product line approach. The court stated only that the
facts alleged did not warrant its consideration or application of
those theories. 84 The court proceeded, however, to distinguish
the facts of Schumacher from those of the cases where these
85
theories were formulated.
In announcing the continuity of enterprise approach, the
court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co." found that the
successor corporation had retained key management personnel
of its predecessor,8 7 a factor not present in Schumacher." As the
Schumacher court pointed out, the only employees of Richards
Shear who became employees of Logemann were two servicemen. 89 Furthermore, the predecessor corporation in Turner dissolved shortly after the sale of assets, and the successor corpora-

81. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 823, 825, 373 N.E.2d 364,
365, 402 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (1977).
82. 59 N.Y.2d 239, 243, 451 N.E.2d 195, 197, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (1983).
83. Id. at 245-46, 451 N.E.2d at 198-99, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 245-48, 451 N.E.2d at 198-200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440-42; see Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974) (continuity of enterprise); Ray v. Aad Corp., 19 Cal.
3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1977) (product line); Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (continuity of enterprise); Ramirez v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) (product line); McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), affd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585
(1972) (continuity of enterprise); see also supra text accompanying notes 24-43.
86. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873.
87. Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 884.
88. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440. The
Schumacher court observed that the exception that came closest to being applicable was
the "mere continuation exception." This exception, the court noted, applies to corporate
reorganization where only one corporation survives. Id. at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 440.
89. Id.
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tion assumed its name.90 In Schumacher, Richards Shear
continued to exist after the sale, and although Logemann had
acquired the right to use the trade name "Richards,"' 1 there is
no indication that it actually did so.
The court indicated that a stronger claim could be asserted
based on the product line theory developed in Ray v. Alad
Corp.,"2 but distinguished the facts of Ray.9 The successor corporation in Ray continued to use the manufacturing plant and
inventory of its predecessor.94 It continued to manufacture the
same product under the same trade name.' 5 Logemann, on the
other hand, did not produce the same type of machine as Richards Shear. 96 Moreover, the successor corporation in Ray continued to deal with its predecessor's customers "with no outward
indication of any change in the ownership of the business.""
There is no indication from the facts in Schumacher that
Logemann ever held itself out as being the same entity as Richards Shear. In fact, by notifying Wallace Steel of its purchase of
Richards Shear's assets and its willingness to continue servicing
the shearing machine, 9 it made it clear that it was a separate
entity.
After sufficiently demonstrating that the facts of Schumacher did not warrant the court's adoption of either the continuity of enterprise or the product line theory, the court considered whether Logemann had a duty of its own to warn Wallace
Steel of defects in the machine." The court applied the test articulated in Leannais v. Cincinnati,Inc.100 and Travis v. Harris,
Inc.101

90. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 884.
91. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 244, 451 N.E.2d at 197, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
92. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 374.
93. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 198-99, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41.
94. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
95. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 6-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
96. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 253, 451 N.E.2d at 203, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (Jasen,
J., dissenting).
97. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
98. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 244, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
99. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 199, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
100. 565 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying
test.
101. 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying
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The facts in Schumacher"' fall between those in Leannais
and Travis. Ironically, at first glance, Schumacher appears to be
more comparable to Travis, where no duty to warn was imposed. 103 Both cases involved a single service call, 104 and in
neither was there a formal takeover of service contracts as in
Leannais.10 5
There are important differences between Travis and Schumacher, however. In Travis, the single service call made by the
defendant corporation's employee was to a prior purchaser of
the defective machine, 10 6 not to the plaintiff's employer as in
Schumacher.10 7 Thus the service call did nothing to create a re-

lationship between Travis and the subsequent purchaser, plaintiff's employer. Furthermore, the record in Travis does not indicate that the defendant was aware of the defects in the
machine.106 In Schumacher, there was at least an issue of fact as
to whether the defendant knew or, on the basis of the service
call, should have known of the defect.109 While the defendant in
Travis may not have known of the location and owner of the
machine,110 Logemann clearly knew these facts and actively offered to service the machine. "1
Schumacher and Leannais, where the successor corporations had a duty to warn, are distinguishable from Travis, where
it did not. The distinction may be the ongoing nature of the relationship between the successor corporation and the buyer of
the defective product. In Travis, there was minimal contact, a
single service call, between the defendant and the buyer of the
product, none between the defendant and its present owner. 1 2
102. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 247-49, 451 N.E.2d at 199-200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 44142.
103. Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d at 449.
104. Id.; Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 253, 451 N.E.2d at 203, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 445
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
105. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 442; see Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d
at 449; Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 253, 451 N.E.2d at 203, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (Jasen, J.,

dissenting).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d
Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 248,
Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d
Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 249,
Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d
Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 248,
Travis v. Harris, Inc., 565 F.2d

at 449.
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
at 449.
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
at 449.
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
at 449.
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In both Leannais and Schumacher, there were repeated contacts
between the defendant corporations and the owners of the products. "' Most of these contacts were initiated by the defendants
in the expectation of an economic advantage." 4 Such continuous
contacts may create the special relationship necessary to create a
duty to warn, where a single contact may not. The court in
Schumacher stressed that it was not imposing a duty to warn on
the basis of the service call alone, but because Logemann attempted to maintain a relationship with Wallace Steel that
would be to Logemann's economic advantage." 5
One factor distinguishing Leannais and Travis from Schumacher is that in the two earlier cases, the failure to allege proximate cause does not appear to have been an issue. The dissent
in Schumacher, while agreeing that a successor corporation may
be liable for failure to warn of defects, would have dismissed the
negligence cause of action where the plaintiff failed to allege, as
necessary under general tort principles, that the breach of duty
to warn was the proximate cause of his injury." 6 The dissent
suggests that the court may be eliminating this element for reasons of social policy, lest the plaintiff be left without a remedy." 7 If this is so, the court may be creating a new cause of
action, labelled negligence, but more akin to strict products liability against successor corporations.
V. Conclusion
In Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co.," 8 the New York
Court of Appeals fashioned a remedy for a person injured by an
allegedly defectively designed product by imposing an independent duty to warn of the defect on the corporation acquiring the
assets of the manufacturer of the product. The court failed to
impose liability on the successor corporation for the acts of its
predecessor under either the continuity of enterprise theory or
113. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 442; Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 248,
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
114. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 442; Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 249,
451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
115. Schumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 249, 451 N.E.2d at 200, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
116. Id. at 250, 451 N.E.2d at 201, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 252, 451 N.E.2d at 202, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 444 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
118. 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983).
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the product line approach.
Although Schumacher appears to extend successor liability,
it is unclear how far-reaching the decision will be. Future decisions will clarify what factors create a special relationship between the successor and buyer of the product. They will also indicate whether the court has in fact eliminated proximate cause
as an element of the successor's breach of duty to warn. Furthermore, the court did not reject the continuity of enterprise or the
product line theory, leaving open the possibility that, given the
proper case, it may embrace one or both of these theories. Successor liability could, therefore, expand even further.
Carol L. Van Scoyoc
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